Paragraph Second: Subject Matter

Article 186

Article 186 - The true object of every contract is the creation of obligations; however, this purpose can only be achieved as long as these obligations themselves have objects and possess certain qualities that bring them together.

Article 187

Article 187: The object may consist of an act (duty to do), a refraining from action (duty not to do), or the transfer of ownership or the establishment of a real right (duty to give).

Article 188

Article 188 - The lack of object leads to the inexistence of the contract. However, the object may consist of a future thing. Nevertheless, one cannot, under penalty of absolute nullity, renounce an unopened inheritance or make any stipulation regarding such an inheritance or one of its objects, even with the consent of the person concerned, without exception.

Article 189

Article 189 - The object must be sufficiently determined, possible, and lawful.

Article 190

Article 190 - The determination must relate to the nature and quantity of the object. However, it is sufficient that the thing be determined as to its kind and that the contract provide a means for specifying its quantity subsequently.

Article 191

Article 191 - A contract is null if an obligation relates to something or a fact that is impossible, unless this impossibility presents an absolute and insurmountable character. The impossibility that exists only in relation to the debtor does not affect the validity of the contract; the unperformed obligation then resolves into damages.

Article 192

Article 192 - A contract whose obligation relates to an illicit or immoral object is null. Things not in trade cannot give rise to an obligation. However, account must be taken of the relativity of the notion of trade, certain goods being repugnant to certain operations while they are perfectly suited to others.

Article 193

Article 193 - One may promise another's act; but this promise binds only the person from whom it emanates and remains ineffective as regards a third party whose freedom remains entire.